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PRODUCTS LIABILITY
JOAN MARIE HART* and F. MICHAEL HART**

I. INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years ago, in Stang v. Hertz,' the New Mexico Supreme Court
embraced the doctrine of strict products liability. The decision adopted
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which holds vendors
and lessors responsible for defective goods which cause injuries to users
or consumers of the goods. 2 This article will discuss the New Mexico
products liability cases reported in 1987, chiefly in the context of causes
of action brought under the strict liability doctrine. Other actions, which
are often appropriate in products liability cases, such as breach of contract,
breach of warranty or negligence, are also discussed as those actions
relate to Section 402A causes of action. Further, the article briefly describes and comments on the 1987 Several Liability Act. 3
The New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed a variety of products
liability issues in the three cases the court decided in 1987. The first case
set out the elements sufficient to state a strict liability claim. 4 The second
attempted to resolve the relationship between strict liability and comparative negligence in the indemnity context. 5 The third case discussed fore*B.A. Harvard University, 1978; J.D. University of New Mexico, 1982.
**B.A. Harvard University, 1983; J.D. University of New Mexico, 1988.
I. 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
2. Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although

(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).

3. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§41-3A-1 to -2 (Supp. 1987). The 1987 Several Liability Act is discussed
in detail in Schultz and Occhialino, Statutory Adoption of Several Liability in New Mexico: A
Commentary and Quasi-Legislative History, 18 N.M.L. REV. 483 (1988).
4. Armijo v. Ed Black's Chevrolet Center, Inc., 105 N.M. 422, 733 P.2d 870 (Ct. App. 1987).
5. Trujillo v. Berry, 106 N.M. 86, 738 P.2d 1331 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 24, 738
P.2d 518 (1987).
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seeability as a matter of law in a strict products case. 6 In the final case
discussed here, the New Mexico Federal District Court considered whether
a hand gun is per se defective under the New Mexico doctrine of strict
products liability.7
II. LIMITATIONS TO WARRANTY ACTIONS IN PRODUCTS CASES

InArmijo v. Ed Black's Chevrolet Center, Inc., "defendant, Ed Black's,
sold a dump truck to plaintiff Armijo's employer. The dump truck was
defective; third-party defendant, Stuart Truck Equipment, had negligently
performed the welds that attached the dump bed to the truck.9 As Armijo
was operating the truck, the bed broke off and the cab jerked violently,
injuring Armijo.'°
Armijo sued Ed Black's in negligence and breach of warranty but not
in strict products liability." Armijo's complaint stated: (1) Ed Black's
sold a truck that Armijo used, (2) the truck had defective welds, and (3)
Armijo was injured because the welds failed.' 2 When discovery revealed
that Stuart's negligence caused the defective welds, the parties filed various motions. 3 The district court granted Ed Black's motions for summary
judgment on the negligence claim and for judgment on the pleadings
regarding the warranty claim.' 4 The court denied Armijo's motion to
amend the complaint to include a strict liability claim.' 5
The New Mexico Court of Appeals upheld the summary judgment on
the negligence claim on the grounds that Stuart, the third-party, admitted
performing the welds and because Armijo presented no evidence of independent negligence on the part of Ed Black's.' 6 The court also upheld
the lower court's ruling on the warranty claim, finding that New Mexico's
version of Section 55-2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.),
"Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Expressed and Implied,"' 7 did
not protect employees of purchasers. 8 Explaining earlier case law and
6. Van de Valde v. Volvo of Am. Corp., 106 N.M. 457, 744 P.2d 930 (Ct. App. 1987).
7. Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F.Supp. 771 (D.N.M. 1987), aff'd, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir.
1988).
8. 105 N.M. 422, 733 P.2d 870 (Ct. App. 1987).
9. Id. at 423, 733 P.2d at 871.
10. Id.
I1. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. N.M. STAT. ANN. §55-2-318 (1978).
18. Id. A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in
the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that
such a person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and if such a person is injured in
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Section 55-2-318, the court determined that the warranty provisions of
the U.C.C. protect only those persons who purchase products from sellers
within the distribution chain of the goods. 9 Armijo did not purchase the
dump truck but merely worked for the purchaser. 2' Therefore, the court
reasoned, the warranties did not run to him. 2' The court noted that such
a holding was in accord with developments in other jurisdictions.22
Finally, the appellate court held that Armijo's complaint was sufficient
to state a claim for relief under strict liability theory, and that the district
court's dismissal of the complaint was error.23 The opinion discusses New
Mexico Civil Procedure Rule 1-008(A)(2) which requires "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. ' ' 24 In reviewing New Mexico case law the court reaffirmed that the
rules of procedure "reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill,"
but rather, "accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate
a proper decision on the merits." 25 Armijo's complaint pleaded allegations
sufficient to state a claim in strict liability even though Armijo did not
mention the words "strict liability."' 26 Therefore, the trial court should
not have dismissed Armijo's claim.27
In holding that the trial court must construe pleadings to allow plaintiffs
to proceed on causes of action pleaded by implication, the court expanded
the plaintiff's ability to collect damages. Distinctions between causes of
action could otherwise be crucial in cases where the statute of limitations
would bar action. For example, under Uniform Commercial Code Section
55-2-725, the limitations period for a warranty action runs for four years
from the date of tender of delivery of the product.28 On the other hand,
the limitations period for negligence in torts expires three years from the
person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-318.
19. Armijo, 105 N.M. at 423-24, 733 P.2d at 871-72. Note that the Official Text of the Uniform
Commercial Code includes a total of three versions of section 2-318. New Mexico adopted the most
restrictive of the alternatives. (Almost half of the jurisdictions that have incorporated section 2-318
warranty liability have adopted one of the other alternatives.) The court in Armijo interpreted New
Mexico's choice as a manifestation of legislative intent to exclude employees of purchasers from
the warranty protections of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 424, 733 P.2d at 872. See J.
WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION § 11-3 "PRIVITY-PERSONAL INJURY"

(3d ed. 1988) for a more complete discussion of this issue.
20. Armijo, 105 N.M. at 423, 733 P.2d at 871.
21. Id. at 424, 733 P.2d at 872.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 425, 733 P.2d at 873.
24. Id. at 424, 733 P.2d at 872; SCRA 1986, 1-008(A)(2).
25. Armijo, 105 N.M. at 424, 733 P.2d at 872 (quoting Hambaugh v. Peoples, 75 N.M. 144,
153, 401 P.2d 777, 782 (1965)).
26. Armijo, 105 N.M. at 424-25, 733 P.2d at 872-73.
27. Id. at 425, 733 P.2d at 872.
28. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-725 (1978).
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date the plaintiff knew or should have discovered the injury.29
III. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
A. Pre-Statute
Trujillo v. Berry,3" the most significant products liability case of the
year, questioned whether a cause of action for indemnity exists in a strict
liability case under New Mexico's comparative negligence theory. In a
difficult opinion, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that comparative
negligence doctrine has no effect on strict products liability in the indemnity context."
In Trujillo, defendant H & P company manufactured, sold, and installed
equipment which fell from the ceiling at defendant Suds-Z Car Wash. 3"
The falling equipment injured plaintiff Trujillo.33 Trujillo sued both H &
P company and the Car Wash for negligence, strict products liability,
breach of warranty, and outrageous and reckless conduct.34 The Car Wash
cross-claimed against H & P for indemnification should plaintiff recover
against the Car Wash under either strict products liability or warranty
theories.35 The trial court dismissed the cross-claim on the ground that
New Mexico's pure comparative negligence doctrine supersedes traditional indemnity principles.3 6
The court of appeals reversed the dismissal and held that common law
indemnity rights between the manufacturer, H & P, and the retailer, SudsZ Car Wash, survive under New Mexico's pure comparative negligence
doctrine.3 7 According to the Trujillo holding, after the fact-finder apportions liability among the parties, if the retailer's liability results solely
from its passive role as the seller of the product furnished by the manufacturer, the retailer may be entitled to indemnification from the manufacturer.38 The court emphasized that indemnity is not always appropriate;
however, the indemnity action will not fail under strict liability doctrine
as a matter of law.39
The court reasoned that the doctrine of strict liability in New Mexico
is not based on fault but is intended to allow an injured user or consumer
29. N.M. STAT. ANN. §37-1-8 (1978).

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

106 N.M. 86, 738 P.2d 1331 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 24, 738 P.2d 518 (1987).
Id.at 87, 738 P.2d at 1332.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 89-90, 738 P.2d at 1334-35.
Id.at 90, 738 P.2d at 1335.
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to recover against a supplier or manufacturer without the requirement of
proving negligence or breach of contract.40 A retailer does not become a
joint tortfeasor subject to apportionment of damages under comparative
negligence doctrine merely because it has been found strictly liable for
injuries caused by a defective product.4 The Trujillo decision addresses
one way a party held strictly liable may seek recovery of a damages
award.
B. Statute
In 1982, the New Mexico Court of Appeals abolished the doctrine of
42
joint and several liability in Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc.,
because it found that joint and several liability was incompatible with
"our pure comparative negligence system." 43 The 1987 New Mexico
Legislature codified this general abandonment of joint and several liability
in causes of action to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies but
retained joint and several liability for the sale and manufacture of defective
products.' The 1987 statute holds co-defendants jointly and severally
liable only for that portion of the damages attributed to them under a
strict liability theory.45 Liability under another theory such as negligence,
however, will be assessed separately against each co-defendant, whether
or not the co-defendant is also liable under the strict products liability
doctrine.46
The same statute codifies the preservation of the New Mexico common
law of indemnity.4 7 That is, as discussed in the Trujillo" case, it preserves
the right of a strictly liable defendant to seek indemnity from a codefendant.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 88, 738 P.2d at 1333.
Id. at 89, 738 P.2d at 1334.
98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
Id. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585.
1987 N.M. Laws, ch. 141 § I (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-3A-I (Cum. Supp. 1987)):
A. In any cause of action to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies, the
doctrine imposing joint and several liability upon two or more wrongdoers whose
conduct proximately caused an injury to any plaintiff is abolished except as otherwise
provided hereafter. The liability of any such defendants shall be several .... C. The
doctrine imposing joint and several liability shall apply: .. . (3) to any persons
strictly liable for the manufacture and sale of a defective product, but only to that
portion of the total liability attributed to those persons; ....
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. §41-3A-IF: "F. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect or impair any right
of indemnity or contribution arising out of any contract of agreement or any right of indemnity
otherwise provided by law."
48. 106 N.M. 86, 738 P.2d 1331 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 24, 738 P.2d 518 (1987).
For a discussion of this case see supra text accompanying notes 30-41.
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IV. FORESEEABILITY
Van de Valde v. Volvo of America Corp.,4 addresses the plaintiff's

burden of proving foreseeability of injury in a strict products liability
case. Plaintiff, Van de Valde, was attempting to load wrought iron curtain
rods onto the roof luggage rack of a Volvo station wagon when car owner
Rosenwald handed plaintiff two straps she found at the rear of the car.5 °
One of the straps was designed by defendant, Volvo, to hold the spare
tire secure in the fire well. 5' While Van de Valde and Rosenwald were
attaching the strap to the luggage rack, it snapped and struck Van de
Valde in the eye.52 The car had come equipped with the strap, in place,
holding the spare tire; the Volvo's owner's manual contained no information or directions for use of the strap and its hooks were specifically
designed to fit into slots located on either side of the spare tire well.53
Van de Valde was not aware of the intended use of the strap until after
the accident.54
Van de Valde sued Rosenwald, Volvo of America and Santa Fe MazdaVolvo, the dealer.55 The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing
the action against the manufacturer and dealer.56
The court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the lower court, holding
that Van de Valde's use of the strap was not reasonably foreseeable as a
matter of law and thus the manufacturer and dealer were not liable under
strict products liability.57 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that
foreseeability, ordinarily a fact question, was properly taken from the
jury in this case because the product's use was "so unintended and unforeseeable" by the manufacturer.58 The court cautioned that there are
instances where an unintended use of a product could be reasonably
anticipated, therefore requiring special safety measures or warnings; to
attach liability, however, the product's use must be "objectively reasonable to expect, not merely what might conceivably occur." 59 Product

liability doctrine does not make the manufacturer and dealer insurers of
any and all risks attendant to the use of the product.'

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

106 N.M. 457, 744 P.2d 930 (Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 457, 744 P.2d at 930.
Id.
Id. at 458, 744 P.2d at 931.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 457, 744 P.2d at 930.
Id.
Id. at 460, 744 P.2d at 933.
Id. at 458-59, 744 P.2d at 931-32.
Id. at 459, 744 P.2d at 932.
Id.
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V. STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY WITHOUT PRODUCT DEFECTS
In Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc.,6 plaintiff Armijo's brother shot and killed
Armijo's husband and attempted to shoot Armijo and her daughter. The
assailant used a handgun imported and distributed by defendant Ex Cam
and manufactured by defendant Armi Tanfoglio Guiseppe. 62 Armijo sued
defendants under four tort theories: the doctrine of strict products liability;
an ultra-hazardous activity theory; negligence; and a "Saturday Night
Special" theory previously adopted by the Maryland Supreme Court.63
This federal diversity case addressed an issue of first impression before
the court, i.e., whether a handgun manufacturer is liable to a victim of
criminal activity which involves the use of one of its products.' 4 The
federal court held that New Mexico would recognize no tort cause of
action in such a case.65
To reach its decision, the court reviewed the elements of a strict products liability action in New Mexico: (1) the product was defective; (2)
the product was defective when it left the hands of the defendant and
was substantially unchanged when it reached the hands of the user; (3)
because of the defect, the product was unreasonably dangerous to the
user; (4) the user was injured; and (5) the defective condition of the
product proximately caused the injury.' The court, however, refused to
accept plaintiff's argument that the gun was defective merely because the
risk of intentional misuse of the product is so great as to outweigh any
potential societal benefit of the product.67
The court considered comment g to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
section 402A, which determines whether the product is defective by
looking to the condition of the product as contemplated by the ultimate
consumer.' Since any potential consumer would recognize that a gun
could be used as a murder weapon, the mere fact that a product is capable
of being misused to criminal ends does not render it defective. 69 Further,
the court reasoned that New Mexico courts would follow the overwhelming weight of authority which rejects strict products liability as a theory
61. 656 F.Supp. 771 (D.N.M. 1987), aff'd, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988).
62. Id. at 772.
63. Id. at 773.
64. Id. at 772.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 773 (citing Tenny v. Seven-up Co., 92 N.M. 158, 584 P.2d 205 (Ct.App.), cert. denied,
92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324 (1978)).
67. Armijo, 656 F.Supp. at 773-74.
68. Id. at 773; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A comment g (1965): "g. Defective
condition. The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the
seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably
dangerous to him ....
69. Armijo, 656 F.Supp. at 773.
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for holding handgun manufacturers liable for the criminal misuse of their
products. 7" The court went on to hold that under New Mexico law, plaintiff's "ultra-hazardous activity" claim (based on Restatement (Second) of
Torts, section 519) failed because guns are commonly distributed, and
the dangers of misuse are so obvious as not to require any manufacturers'
warnings. 7"
The court also declined to impose a duty upon the manufacturers of
firearms not to sell their products because they have a potential to be
misused for the purpose of criminal activity.72 Thus, the court disposed
of the negligence claim.
Finally, the court dismissed the Maryland cause of action which pertains
to strict liability for manufacturers of inexpensive, easily concealed handguns which have little societal value but are often used in criminal activity.73 The federal district court could find no New Mexico support for
such a theory.74 The court commented upon the inherent difficulty of
enforcing "Saturday Night Special" liability considering that all weapons
are capable of being used in criminal activity, and that the more expensive,
more accurate firearms, which logically are deadlier, would not expose
manufacturers to liability under the Maryland theory.75
VI. CONCLUSION
Although strict products liability is not new to the common law of New
Mexico, the four cases decided in 1987 have added definition to the
theory and have articulated the courts' willingness to modify the doctrine
in the face of evolving statutory and case law developments. The principal
philosophy of Restatement section 402A, however, that a user or consumer injured by a defective product need not prove fault to recover,
remains essentially unchanged.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 774-75.
Id. at 775.
Id.(discussing Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (Ct. App. 1985)).
Armijo, 656 F. Supp. at 775.
Id.

